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A. Introduction
In Oneida Ltd. v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the
Southern District of New York addressed the issue of whether a debtor’s liability for pension
termination premiums (“DRA Premiums”) constituted a pre-petition contingent “claim” and was,
therefore, dischargeable pursuant to the debtor’s reorganization plan confirmation. 383 B.R. 29,
32 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008). The Bankruptcy Court held that the debtor’s liability for DRA
premiums was a dischargeable pre-petition “claim” even though the pension termination occurs
during the debtor’s chapter 11 case. Id. at 32, 43.
The Bankruptcy Court based its holding on three determinations: (1) that DRA Premiums
fell within Bankruptcy Code section 101(5)(A)’s definition of the term “claim”; (2) that the
resulting “claim” arose pre-petition despite 29 U.S.C. § 1341(c)(2)(B), which provides that DRA
Premiums shall not arise “until the date of discharge”; and (3) that the Deficit Reduction Act of
2005 (“DRA Amendment”), an amendment of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(“ERISA”), did not present a “clear and manifest” intent of Congress to amend the Bankruptcy
Code, a threshold issue that must be met before the Bankruptcy Court could consider the DRA
Amendment’s underlying policies. Id. at 36–38, 40–41.
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The Bankruptcy Court dismissed the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation’s (“PBGC”)
argument that DRA Premiums were not “claims.” The PBGC had argued that DRA Premiums
are not “claims” because, by statute, the PBGC’s right to payment was not enforceable until
Oneida’s chapter 11 discharge or case dismissal. Dismissing this argument, the Bankruptcy
Court held that DRA Premiums constituted pre-petition “classic contingent claim[s].” Id. at 38.
The decision is currently under appeal to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. As of
now, the Bankruptcy Court’s Oneida decision is the first reported and only decision to consider
whether DRA Premiums are “claims” under section 101(5)(A). However, case precedent
provides guidance in assessing whether the Bankruptcy Court correctly decided Oneida.
Case precedent addresses whether a section 101(5)(A) “claim” exists and, if so, whether
the “claim” arises pre- or post-petition. First, precedent instructs that whether a “claim” exists
should de determined according to 101(5)(A)’s “text, history, and purpose.” Next, precedent
establishes three distinct tests to determine when a “claim” arises: (1) when a cause of action for
a right to payment exists under non-bankruptcy law; (2) when events creating an eventual right
to payment under non-bankruptcy law first begin; and (3) when events creating an eventual right
to payment under non-bankruptcy law first begin, but only if the creditor-claimant “had some
type of specific relationship with the debtor at that time.” Lemelle v. Universal Mfg. Corp., 18
F.3d 1268, 1275–76 (5th Cir. 1994). Last, precedent establishes that a court must determine
whether a pre-petition “claim” exists before the court can consider non-bankruptcy law policies
that may weigh against discharging liability.
Second Circuit precedent supports the Bankruptcy Court’s Oneida decision. Under both
the Second Circuit’s variation of the third test as well as other circuits’ variations, DRA
Premiums would most likely face discharge. Additionally, the first test, the most generous of the
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three to creditors, has been either rejected or narrowed. Thus, DRA Premiums will most likely
remain dischargeable under chapter 11 pension terminations unless Congress amends the
Bankruptcy Code.

B. DRA Premiums
DRA Premiums were added to the law by the DRA Amendment, which became effective
only weeks before Oneida, a leading flatware manufacturer, filed chapter 11. In re Oneida Ltd.,
351 B.R. 79, 81 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006). DRA Premiums permit the PBGC to impose upon
companies terminating defined-benefit pension plans a $1,250 premium for each person who was
a plan participant at the time of termination. 29 U.S.C. § 1341(c)(2)(A). Under subsection (B)
of the DRA Amendment, DRA Premiums “shall not apply to [a termination] plan [that occurs
during a bankruptcy reorganization] until the date of the discharge.” 29 U.S.C. 1341(c)(2)(B)
(2006). However, Congress did not explicitly state in subsection (B) that DRA Premiums cannot
be discharged in a chapter 11 proceeding. Thus, courts must consider whether DRA Premiums
are dischargeable claims under the Bankruptcy Code.
1. Section 101(5)(A) Claims
In general, the term “claim” is considered broad in scope, evidenced by Bankruptcy Code
section 101(5)(A)’s “text, history, and purpose.” Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 83
(1991). First, section 101(5)(A)’s plain meaning dictates that all rights to payment contingent on
the occurrence of a later event constitute “claims.” The section defines what constitutes a
“claim.” A “claim” is defined as a “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to
judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed,
legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) (2006) (emphasis added).
Cite as: Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation’s Termination Premiums Constitute Dischargeable
Pre-Petition Contingent Claims, 1 ST. JOHN'S BANKR. RESEARCH LIBR. NO. 32, at 3 (2009),
http://www.stjohns.edu/academics/graduate/law/journals/abi/sjbrl_main/volume/v1/Rooney.stj
(follow "View Full PDF").

Rooney - 4

Second, the section’s legislative history supports a broad interpretation: “Congress intended by
[the section’s] language to adopt the broadest available definition of ‘claim.’” Id. See H.R. Rep.
No. 95–595, at 309 (1977), U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 6266 (1978) (“[The Code]
contemplates that all legal obligations of the debtor . . . will be able to be dealt with in [a]
bankruptcy case.”). Third, a broad reading of the term “claim” promotes bankruptcy law’s
“fresh start” policy to leave debtors free from creditors’ interests, which supports a broad
interpretation of “claim.” See In re Quigley, 383 B.R. 19, 25 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008).
Despite section 101(5)(A)’s broad scope, what constitutes a “claim” is “not infinite.”
LTV Steel v. Shalala (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 53 F.3d 478, 497 (2d Cir. 1995) (hereinafter,
“Chateaugay II”). See Bennett v. Bennett (In re Bennett), 175 B.R. 181, 183 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1994) (holding that an interest in a pension plan was not a claim without a secured court order
determining the interest’s extent). For example, an interest is not a claim where the debtor does
not withdraw from the pension, and thereby trigger liability, until after its plan confirmation.
CPT Holdings v. Indus. and Allied Union Employees Pension Plan, 162 F.3d 405, 408–09 (6th
Cir. 1998) (distinguishing not only cases where claims arose due to pre-petition termination but
also claims that arose due to termination during bankruptcy proceedings). Further, section
101(5)(A)’s legislative history contains nothing to “suggest[] that Congress intended to discharge
a creditor’s rights before the creditor knew or should have known that its rights existed.” Jensen
v. Jensen (In re Jensen), 995 F.2d 925, 930 (9th Cir. 1993).
2. Three Tests To Determine When A “Claim” Arises
“Claims” must arise pre-petition to be dischargeable pursuant to Bankruptcy Code
section 1141. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(1) (2006) (“Except as otherwise provided . . . , the
confirmation of a plan discharges the debtor from any debt . . . that arose before the date of such
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confirmation . . . .”). See Johnson, 501 U.S. at 84 n.5 (clarifying that, under the Bankruptcy
Code, the term “claim” is considered coextensive with the term “debt”). While section 523(a) of
the Bankruptcy Code contains exceptions to the discharge of claims that arise pre-petition, these
exceptions do not include DRA Premiums. Notably, section 523(a) was amended only a short
while prior to the DRA Amendment’s enactment, evidence that the omission was intentional.
See Oneida, 383 B.R. at 41 n.14.
Courts use three tests to determine when a section 101(5)(A) “claim” arises. See Lemelle,
18 F.3d at 1275–77. Under the first test, a “claim” arises when a cause of action for a right to
payment exists under non-bankruptcy law. Id. at 1275. For example, in Avellino & Bienes v. M.
Frenville Co. (In re M. Frenville Co.), the claim at issue, an accounting firm’s non-contractual
right to indemnity from a debtor, did not accrue until the indemnity-creating party filed suit. 744
F.2d 332, 337 (3d Cir. 1984). Thus, because the suit was filed post-petition, the “claim” was not
dischargeable. Id. This first test is widely rejected for contravening the Supreme Court’s broad
interpretation of section 101(5). See, e.g., Watson v. Parker (In re Parker), 313 F.3d 1267,
1269–70 (10th Cir. 2002) (declining to follow Frenville’s “limiting definition of claim”).
Under the second test, a “claim” arises when events creating an eventual right to payment
under non-bankruptcy law first begin. Lemelle, 18 F.3d at 1275. Here, unlike the first test, a
“claim” can arise pre-petition even when some liability-creating elements are not satisfied until
post-petition. See Grady v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 839 F.2d 198, 202–03 (4th Cir. 1988). Thus, a
“claim” can arise pre-petition when the creditor holds pre-petition rights “contingent” on a future
event’s occurrence. See Id.
Courts implementing the second test rely on section 101(5)(A)’s express language, which
includes “contingent” rights to payment. See, e.g., In re Manville Forest Products Corp., 225
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B.R. 862, 866 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1998). These courts narrowly interpret the Supreme Court’s
statement in Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare v. Davenport that a right to payment is
“nothing more nor less than an enforceable obligation.” 495 U.S. 552, 559 (1990), superseded
on other grounds by Criminal Victims Protection Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-581, § 3. These
courts hold that Davenport does not require a presently enforceable obligation. See, e.g., PearlPhil GMT (Far East) Ltd. v. Caldor Corp., 266 B.R. 575, 581 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2001).
While the first and second tests differ, circuit courts employing both tests recognize that a
“claim” may arise pre-petition even when jurisdictional prerequisites to filing a claim were not
fulfilled until after the debtor’s plan confirmation. See, e.g., Kilbarr Corp. v. Gen. Servs. Admin.
(In re Remington Rand Corp.), 836 F.2d 825, 826 (3d Cir. 1988). For example, in McSherry v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc., a discriminatory termination claim, a “claim” was dischargeable
because it was based on actions that occurred before the former employee’s company’s plan
confirmation. 81 F.3d 739, 740 ( 8th Cir. 1996). The “claim” did not arise later because the
employee’s “right to sue letter,” which he received post-confirmation, was distinguished as a
jurisdictional prerequisite. Id. at 741.
Under the third test, a “claim” arises when events creating an eventual right to payment
under non-bankruptcy law first begin, but only if the creditor-claimant “had some type of
specific relationship with the debtor at that time.” Lemelle, 18 F.3d at 1276. This third, middle
ground test’s requisite “specific relationship” must begin pre-petition. Id. In a Second Circuit
variation of the third test, a “specific relationship” may be proven when the relationship at issue
“provides sufficient contemplation of contingencies based on pre-petition conduct.” United
States v. LTV Corp. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 944 F.2d 997, 1005 (2d Cir. 1991) (hereinafter,
“Chateaugay I”). In another variation, a “specific relationship” may be proven through certain
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factors: “contact, exposure, impact, or privity” between the debtor and the creditor. In re Piper
Aircraft Corp., 162 B.R. 619, 627 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1994). Comparatively, in Lemelle v.
Universal Manufacturing Corp., no “specific relationship” and, thus, no “claim” existed because
the injured parties were “completely unknown and unidentified” when the debtor filed for
chapter 11. 18 F.3d at 1277.
3. Policy-Based Interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code
If the bankruptcy court determines that a dischargeable pre-petition, contingent “claim”
exists, the creditor might argue that the non-bankruptcy statute’s underlying policies support
interpreting the Bankruptcy Code to uphold the liability’s enforceability. Second Circuit
precedent instructs that courts should interpret the Bankruptcy Code pursuant to Congress’s
“clear and manifest” intent before considering DRA Amendment’s underlying policies. Oneida,
383 B.R. at 41.
In Oneida, the Bankruptcy Court distinguished statutory interpretation in the bankruptcy
context from statutory interpretation generally. In the bankruptcy context, “there is a strong
presumption that a later law does not repeal or amend an established law such as the Bankruptcy
Code.” Id. at 40. In Oneida, this presumption conflicted with statutory interpretation generally
where “a statute must, if reasonably possible, be construed in a way that will give force and
effect to each of its provisions rather than render some of them meaningless.” Allen Oil Co. v.
Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 614 F.2d 335, 339 (2d Cir. 1980). Therefore, following the first
maxim, courts that interpret DRA Premiums as “claims” under Bankruptcy Code section 101(5)
might not consider the DRA Premium’s underlying policies because the DRA Amendment
presents an irreconcilable conflict with the Bankruptcy Code. While the “claims” would be
dischargeable under Bankruptcy Code section 101(5), DRA Amendment subsection (B) would
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require that DRA Premiums would not be dischargeable because subsection (B) requires that
DRA Premiums do not arise until post-petition. 29 U.S.C. 1341(c)(2)(B). Contrastingly,
following the second maxim, courts that interpret DRA Premiums as “claims” might consider the
DRA Premium’s underlying policies because the effect of holding DRA Premiums dischargeable
would be to render them largely irrelevant when termination occurs in bankruptcy.

C. Arguments Made by Oneida and the PBGC
1. On Whether DRA Premiums Constitute “Claims”
In Oneida, the Bankruptcy Court agreed with Oneida’s arguments and held that DRA
Premiums constituted pre-petition, contingent “claims” under section 101(5)(A). Arguing that
DRA Premiums constituted “claims,” Oneida relied on section 101(5)(A)’s broad scope and
Oneida’s certain post-petition DRA Premium liability. Oneida argued that DRA Premiums
constituted contingent “claims” because DRA Premiums “arose from Oneida’s prepetition
pension plan” and because the claim “became fixed as a result of an event occurring prior to
confirmation – the termination, in bankruptcy, of the Oneida Pension Plan.” Memorandum of
Law in Support of Plaintiff Oneida Ltd.’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 14, Oneida Ltd. v.
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., No. 06–10489 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007). Agreeing with Oneida,
the Bankruptcy Court found that DRA Premium liability was contingent in name only because
the contingency rested upon two alternatives, one of which was guaranteed to occur. Oneida,
383 B.R. at 38 (“[DRA Premiums] will arise at the time the debtor obtains a discharge or at the
time the case is dismissed.”).
The Bankruptcy Court rejected the PBGC’s contrary position that the DRA Premiums
were not contingent “claims.” The Bankruptcy Court distinguished CPT Holdings, upon which
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the PBGC relied, from Oneida, noting that the debtor in CPT Holdings terminated its pension
obligations post-confirmation, 162 F.3d at 408–09, while the debtor in Oneida terminated its
pension obligations pre-confirmation. 383 B.R. at 39. To support this distinction, the court
noted that the decision in CPT Holdings implied that pre-confirmation termination would have
created a contingent “claim.” See 162 F.3d at 408–09.
2. Whether the “Claims” Arose Pre-Petition
After recognizing DRA Premiums as “claims,” the Bankruptcy Court considered whether
the “claims” arose pre-petition. The Bankruptcy Court could not rely solely on statutory
language because “[t]he Bankruptcy Code does not specify when a contingent claim arises.”
Oneida, 383 B.R. at 42. Thus, the Court relied on the Chateaugay I variation of the third test.
Id. at 43. The Court stated, “[T]he critical factor is whether, at the time of the petition, the
parties contemplated that the contingent obligation would exist if the contingency occurred.” Id.
See In re Chateaugay, 944 at 1005 (finding that a sufficient relationship existed in a statutory
context between the regulating agency and those subject to regulation); see also In re Jensen,
995 F.2d at 931 (discharging a statute-based claim under a variation of the third test, which
required “sufficient [pre-petition] knowledge . . . of potential liability”). The Bankruptcy Court
determined that, for statutory rights to payment, “claims” arise upon “commencement of the
relationship between the parties, not the date when the right to payment becomes enforceable.”
Oneida, 383 B.R. at 43. The Bankruptcy Court found that a sufficient relationship existed
because (1) the parties’ DRA Amendment relationship formed pre-petition; and (2) the parties
met pre-petition to discuss Oneida’s potential pension termination. Id. at 43–44.
While the Bankruptcy Court agreed with Oneida’s main pre-petition argument, the Court
rejected two secondary arguments. First, the Bankruptcy Court distinguished the Chateaugay I
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variation of the third test from a “conduct”-related variation. The Court determined that the
“conduct” variation applies to tort settings and “conduct-related statutory obligation[s]” only, not
contract-based statutory obligations such as DRA Premiums. Id. at 44. Therefore, the
Bankruptcy Court rejected Oneida’s argument that DRA Premiums arose pre-petition because
the pension plans were “based on the prepetition labor of the participants.” Memorandum of
Law in Support of Plaintiff Oneida Ltd.’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 2, Oneida Ltd. v.
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., No. 06–10489. Second, the Court rejected Oneida’s reliance
on Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation v. Skeen (In re Bayley Corp.). While In re Bayley
stated that “withdrawal liability [is] based on benefits earned as a result of employees' prepetition labor, even if incurred post-petition”, the Tenth Circuit determined that a pre-petition
“claim” existed because of plan funding deficiencies that occurred pre-petition. 163 F.3d 1205,
1206–09 (10th Cir. 1998). In Oneida, no plan funding deficiencies existed.
The Bankruptcy Court rejected the PBGC’s argument under the first test that DRA
Premium “claims” arose post-petition. The Bankruptcy Court rejected the PBGC’s argument
that, because the DRA Amendment states that DRA Premiums “shall not apply . . . until the date
of the discharge,” 29 U.S.C. § 1341(c)(2)(B), DRA Premium “claims” arose post-petition and,
therefore, did not become enforceable under non-bankruptcy law until discharge. Memorandum
of Law in Support of PBGC’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 10–11, Oneida Ltd. v. Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corp., No. 06–10489 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007). The PBGC argued that, under
Worldcom, Inc. v. MCI, Inc., (In re Worldcom, Inc.), 546 F.3d 211, 221 (2d Cir. 2008), no right
to payment exists until all the elements of the claim exist. Memorandum of Law in Support of
PBGC’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 11, Oneida Ltd. v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp.,
No. 06–10489. See Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 170 (1946)
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(Frankfurter, J. concurring) (“If there was no valid claim before bankruptcy, there is no claim for
a bankruptcy court either to recognize or to reject.”).
The Bankruptcy Court rejected the PBGC’s first test argument. Oneida, 383 B.R. at 39.
While the Bankruptcy Court stated that “[t]he PBGC is correct that non-bankruptcy law . . .
governs issues such as the . . . enforceability of . . . the right to payment,” the Court continued
that “[b]ankruptcy law governs . . . whether such claim arose pre- or post-petition.” Id.
Additionally, while the Bankruptcy Court did not argue this point, even if the widely criticized
first test survives in other contexts, where federal law applies as it does here, the first test most
likely does not apply. See Frenville, 744 F.2d at 337 (“[T]he threshold question of when a right
to payment arises, absent overriding federal law, ‘is to be determined by reference to state law.’”
(quoting Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm., 329 U.S. at 161)).
3. Whether the DRA Amendment’s Policy Intervenes
The Bankruptcy Court rejected the PBGC’s argument to consider the DRA Amendment’s
underlying policies and Congress’s intent “to put the PBGC on a more secure financial
foundation.” H.R. Rep. 109-276, 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005). The Court decided that, even
though the DRA Amendment states that DRA Premiums “shall not apply . . . until the date of the
discharge,” Congress did not explicitly state that DRA Premiums arise post-petition. When a
statute would rearrange the hierarchy of creditors, bankruptcy courts require more definitive
statutory language. See, e.g., Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Kitty Hawk Int’l, Inc., 255 B.R.
428, 438–39 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2000).
The Bankruptcy Court agreed with Oneida’s argument that “if Congress wishes to alter
any fundamental principles of bankruptcy law – such as the dischargeability of claims – to
accommodate non-bankruptcy policies, the appropriate way to do so is to amend the Bankruptcy
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Code itself.” Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff Oneida Ltd.’s Motion for Summary
Judgment at 3, Oneida Ltd. v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., No. 06–10489. As Oneida
argued, “Under the governing law . . . , this Court must implement the terms of the Bankruptcy
Code without regard to any policy concerns that may be embodied in the ERISA Amendment.”
Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff Oneida Ltd.’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 4,
Oneida Ltd. v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., No. 06–10489. The Bankruptcy Court agreed.
Oneida, 383 B.R. at 42. Thus, the Court refused to consider the PBGC’s financial stability in
determining whether to discharge the DRA Premiums. Id. See Chateaugay I, 944 F.2d at 1002–
05 (concluding that engaging in a balancing of conflicting statutes’ objectives would be improper
to determine whether a claim is discharged).

D. Conclusion
Second Circuit precedent provides strong support for the Bankruptcy Court’s Oneida
decision. While the Second Circuit’s variation of the third test is broad, other circuits’ variations
of the third test would most likely discharge DRA Premiums as well. These circuits provide a
difficult hurdle for creditors facing a 101(5)(A) issue to argue absence of facts showing that the
parties could have contemplated the claim. Further, the first test, promulgated by the Third
Circuit and most generous to creditors, will most likely face continued narrowing. Therefore,
DRA Premiums will most likely remain dischargeable under chapter 11 pension terminations
unless Congress amends the Bankruptcy Code.
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